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Hak [1] considers the role of the Forensic Science Regulator and
whether the Regulatory Notice [2] regarding provision of opinion
evidence on image enhancement and image comparison intrudes
into the purview of the court. The four principles set out in the
notice are as follows:
Principle 1 The evidence containing opinion must be admissible in
this jurisdiction as expert evidence.
Principle 2 The person proposing to give opinion evidence must be
an expert in all relevant aspects they intend to give an
opinion on.
Principle 3 The person giving evidence must comply with all legal
obligations including setting out limitations on the
evidence.
Principle 4 If the expert’s opinion relies on the results of any
method the report shall take proper account of matters
such as the degree of precision or margin of uncer-
tainty, affecting the accuracy or reliability of those
results.
All are a restatement of established legal principles in England
and Wales and as such, do no more than remind the practitioner
of their legal obligations. Of these, only Principle 2, which calls
upon an expert to be expert in all relevant aspects they are giving
opinion on, appears to be disputed; in particular, subsections b.
and c., which are reproduced below:
b. Expertise in CCTV, video, imaging, enhancement etc does not
equate to expertise on the content of the image.
c. Unless they are also an expert in the content of the images,
imagery experts must not attempt to give expert opinion evi-
dence on the meaning of a comparison between the objects in
question.
There is a whole canon of case law on expert opinion. The com-
mon theme is that evidence of opinion is only admissible where the
judge and jury require the assistance of evidencewhich depends on
the application of specialist skill or knowledge. For example, R v.
Cooper [1998] EWCA Crim 2258 states an “expert’s opinion is ad-
missible to furnish the court with scientific information which is
likely to be outside the experience and the knowledge of a judgeDOI of original article: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.fsisyn.2019.07.005.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.fsisyn.2019.09.006
2589-871X/© 2019 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article uor jury. If, on the other hand, on the proven facts or on the nature
of the evidence, a judge or jury can form their own conclusions
without help, then the opinion of an expert is unnecessary”. So
far as expert witness competence is concerned, the Criminal Prac-
tice Directions (CrimPD), reflecting the common law position,
make clear that in one of the conditions that govern the admissi-
bility of expert evidence is that “the witness is competent to give
that opinion” [3]. The Criminal Procedure Rules (CrimPR) impose
obligations upon experts to provide opinions within their areas of
expertise [4], to define these areas both in reports and when testi-
fying [5] and, when testifying, to draw the court’s attention to ques-
tions the answers to which would fall outside the ambit of those
areas [6]. Moreover, the CrimPD, recognising that some expert ev-
idence may lack a sufficiently scientific basis to justify its admission
[7], indicate that when the court is determining the reliability of
expert evidence the matters it may take into account include “the
extent to which the expert’s opinion is based on material falling
outside the expert’s own field of expertise” [8]. Finally, the CrimPR
require a party serving an expert report to serve alongside it,
“notice of anything of which the party serving it is aware which
might reasonably be thought capable ofd (i) undermining the reli-
ability of the expert’s opinion, …” [9]. These provisions of the
CrimPR and of the CrimPD make clear that the English and Welsh
courts take the issue of experts giving evidence that falls outside
their field of expertise very seriously and expect both experts and
instructing parties to make clear where this is the case. This infor-
mation is important both when the court is determining the admis-
sibility of expert evidence and when it is evaluating the weight of
such evidence. In the absence of such transparency from experts,
it is more difficult for lawyers, judges and juries to challenge or
determine the true scope of expert competence. The Regulatory
Notice is intended to alignwith and support the attainment of these
principles in a specific context by helping experts to identify issues
that feed into the CrimPR and CrimPD requirements outlined
above.
R v. Atkins & Atkins [2009] EWCA Crim 1876, when discussing
the issue of comparing facial feature in the absence of a statistical
database, was clear that an “expert who spends years studying
this kind of comparison can properly form a judgment as to the sig-
nificance of what he has found in any particular case. It is a judg-
ment based on his experience. A jury is entitled to be informed of
his assessment. The alternative, of simply leaving the jury to
make up its own mind about the similarities and dissimilarities,
with no assistance at all about their significance, would be to give
the jury raw material with no means of evaluating.” Hak agrees
with the conclusion of the Forensic Science Regulator that facialnder the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
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required rather than expertise in any general form of comparison;
why, in principle, are other subject areas different? There are
many objects within CCTV footage where failure to have specialist
knowledge of the similarities and dissimilarities and their signifi-
cance would render an imagery expert no more qualified than
the jury to give an opinion on the meaning of a comparison. In an
example known to the Forensic Science Regulator, an imagery
expert concluded that two images showed the same vehicle, but
an individual with expert knowledge of that type of vehicle was
able to identify a difference in the light housing between the two
images. This difference meant that the two images could not have
been of the same vehicle. An imagery expert who presents opinions
on such issues when they do not have the specialist knowledge to
do so risks misleading the court and, by being no more qualified
than the jury, they could be said to be usurping the role of the jury.
R v Coles [2018] EWCACrim 407was cited to show that the issue
of whether a subject matter expert was required had been recently
considered. The prosecution witness gave evidence that she recog-
nised the defendant who she knew sufficiently well for this pur-
pose; this is not expert opinion and is governed by the rules in
PACE Code D [10]. From the judgment, it would appear that only
in cross examination did the defence expert discuss similarities in
the clothing. An item’s colour under particular lighting or camera
conditions is an area where imagery experts have specific knowl-
edge and expertise which may be able to assist the court in some
cases. In this case, however, the judgment concluded that “the
question of linking the appearance and colour of an object which
the jury had - the jacket - with the appearance and colour on the
video does not require, in [the court’s] view, expert evidence”.
This echoes subsection (c) of Principle 2 of the Regulatory Notice,
which has mistakenly been interpreted by Hak as a requirement
to have a second expert present. If there is a subject matter expert
who can “furnish the court with scientific information which is
likely to be outside the experience and the knowledge of a judge
or jury” [11], their evidence may be required. However, in some
cases, once any imagery artefacts have been accounted for, the
court may decide that no further expertise is required; this is the
position in R v Coles.
Hak describes the work of the expert in forensic video analysis,
using an example of images of vehicles to describe their work
“addressing such issues as aspect ratio, compression artefacts, mo-
tion blur, lighting, resolution and other technical considerations”:
we concur that these activities arewithin the expertise of reputable
experts in forensic video analysis and are invaluable in enabling the
court to understand technicalities that are not within the expertise
of lay judges or jurors. Without this expertise, a lay person would
be in danger of mistaking a technical artefact for a difference be-
tween two images or could fail to appreciate the impact that, for
example, missing frames could have made.
Hak goes on to describe the comparison phase, again using the
example of vehicle comparison, thus: “The expert would then
conduct a scientific comparison of the questioned and known vehi-
cles and provide a qualitative opinion as to the relationship be-
tween the vehicles.” A scientific comparison is of course what
should happen, by a suitably qualified expert. However, inmany ex-
amples of such work seen by the Forensic Science Regulator, the
approach deployed is not a scientifically robust process. Continuing
the vehicle example, although noting that similar problems exist
across other comparison types, many analysts currently start
from a position of attempting to exclude the known vehicle as being
the same as the vehicle in the questioned footage, by checking if
there are any differences that cannot be accounted for by technicalissues. Only if the vehicle cannot be excluded as being that in the
questioned footage does the analyst attempt to provide a “qualita-
tive opinion as to the relationship between the vehicles”. This two-
stage interpretation is not the best way to carry out an evaluation of
evidential strength. One of the problems with first attempting to
exclude is that the poorer the quality of the imagery, the less likely
is it that the analyst will be able to find sufficient differences to
exclude the known vehicle as being that in the questioned footage.
Wording such as “despite making every effort to do so, I have not
been able to exclude [item x] as being that observed in the [CCTV
footage from the crime]” has the potential to be highly biasing,
yet it may be that there are very few features in poor quality footage
that would be capable of making an exclusion. When the analyst is
unable to exclude, they currently then attempt to qualify, using a
verbal scale, the strength of support for the two vehicles being
the same. This assessment appears to be based only on the quality
of the imagery (what features can be seen) and the level of similar-
ity between the vehicles and to be prone to large (and unquanti-
fied) levels of variation within and between analysts. There
appears, in the majority of instances the Regulator has seen, to be
no consideration of the probability of the observed level of similar-
ity if the items are in fact different. Neither does there appear to be
any form of calibration of the opinion produced in this way.
In order to make a balanced and meaningful scientific interpre-
tation, a scientist must address two or more competing proposi-
tions within the framework of circumstances of the case; for
each, the scientist must consider the probability of the findings,
given the proposition [12]. Returning to the vehicles example,
where the propositions could take the form:
The vehicle in the questioned footage is the same vehicle as that
in the known footage.
The vehicle in the questioned footage is some other unknown
vehicle.
The findings here will consist of a collection of observations on
the questioned footage, some of which will be similar to observa-
tions on the known footage and some of which will be different.
It is necessary to address questions of the form:
What is the probability that those observations would have
been made if the first proposition were true?
What is the probability that those observations would have
been made if the second proposition were true?
It is the ratio of those two probabilities that is central to the eval-
uation. We do not expect that the scientist would necessarily have
themeans to provide quantitative probabilities (and this is the state
inmany forensic comparative disciplines as they are currently prac-
tised, including handwriting, toolmarks and fingerprints) but we do
consider it reasonable for the scientist to form a qualitative view
about which of the two probabilities is the larger. The greater the
ratio between the scientist’s assignments of the two probabilities,
the greater the weight of evidence in favour of the former proposi-
tion (and, of course, vice versa). The evaluation will be conditioned
heavily by the scientist’s knowledge of the domain including, in
particular, the proportion of vehicles on the roads that would
give rise to features observed in the questioned image. Opinions
formed in this way should be subject to calibration by regular
participation in proficiency tests using CCTV footage of similar
quality to that observed in casework, but where the true identity
of the objects in question is known by the organiser.
If the expert has no such domain knowledge, he or she is not in a
position to provide a balanced evaluation to the court: evaluating
only the probability of the findings if the vehicle in the questioned
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anced and has little meaning, even supposing that minor differ-
ences between variants of vehicle models are successfully
identified. Referring to an unbalanced evaluation of only one prop-
osition as a scientific comparison or opinion will mislead the court.
Hak argues that the expert is trained to understand how the im-
aging process affects the applicable subject matter and to look at
class and individual characteristics for both similarities and dissim-
ilarities (much of which we agree) but he then concludes that “the
Forensic Scale is used by image comparison experts to properly
describe the strength of their opinion.” As set out above, this
opinion does not currently appear to be “properly described” or
based on scientific principles of interpretation. It lacks, for classes
of item not within the expertise of the video analyst, knowledge
of the independence or otherwise of class characteristics or the
probability of observing the findings under competing proposi-
tion(s). Applying a “Forensic Scale” without the appropriate scien-
tifically justified reasoning and then referring to “scientific
comparison” risks giving a false impression that the evaluation is
scientific when it is not. That is why, as is entirely proper, the Regu-
lator has focussed on the science.
Research has demonstrated that an expert in comparison of one
class of object does not perform as an expert when comparing
different classes of objects (e.g. Ref. [13] for an overview [14]; for
a specific example concerning vehicles). It is also essential to learn
the lessons of comparison evidence from disciplines such as micro-
scopic hair comparison, where examiners reached conclusions
about questioned and known hair samples which went beyond
any scientific justification [15]. We have yet to see scientific evi-
dence for the conclusions reached by imagery analysts in respect
of vehicles, clothing or any other subject matter with the exception
of facial comparison, where there have been a number of studies
into the effectiveness of trained and untrained individuals in car-
rying out facial comparison [16]. Similar research has been carried
out on fingerprint comparison [17].
Hak refers to the use of comparison evidence in court for de-
cades, but in no other area of forensic science does a reputable
expert attempt to provide an interpretation of a comparison
when they have no expertise within that discipline: a fingerprint
expert will not conduct comparison of footwear marks unless he
or she has been specifically trained in footwear marks and vice
versa. The conclusions reached by such experts depend not only
on their evaluation of similarities and differences between marks
but also on their knowledge of the subject matter: the fact that
no differences are observed between two footwear marks does
not mean that the marks were made by the same shoe; there
must also be consideration of the probability of observing indistin-
guishable marks if they were left by different shoes.
Notwithstanding the disagreements above, in the final analysis,
we differ from Hak on only one of three points in his suggested
approach. It is indisputable that judges hold the responsibility of
determining admissibility but in order that they can do so, the
expert is obliged to disclose any and all limitations of their evidence
and their expertise. All experts have a legal obligation to confine
their opinion to their own area of expertise; it should not be left
to the court to uncover a lack of expertise that has not been
made clear. We agree that more training is indeed required. We
are in agreement that a subject matter expert is required for facial
comparison and for determining the type of vehicle, clothing, or
other object shown. It is only in relation to a general comparison
that we differ. Here, it is possible that a content expert may be
required or, depending on the case circumstances, it is possible
that all the court requires is for the imagery expert to explain the
t-echnical issues with the footage that could make an object appear
more similar or more different than a lay person might expect.
Beyond that, it may be that the expert is no more qualified than
the juror to assess whether or not the items are the same.
The difference may in the end be one of emphasis: Hak argues
that the issue is one of competence and that the Regulator should
mandate training and certification standards. We are in agreement
that only those with the correct expertise, using an appropriate sci-
entific method, should give opinion evidence in comparison. There-
fore, the Regulator continues to press for compliance with the
required standards, which require both demonstration of compe-
tence and scientific validity of methods. To reiterate, the proper
method for scientific evaluation of evidence is balanced, evaluating
the probability of the evidence under at least two alternate propo-
sitions. Without knowledge of the subject area, it is difficult to see
how an “expert in general comparison” could properly evaluate the
probability of their observations under the proposition that the
items being compared are not the same; that leaves an unbalanced
evaluation based solely on the level of similarity between the items
and the level of detail that can be seen in the footage.
In conclusion we note that, prior to publication, the Regulatory
Noticewas subject to detailed consideration by the Forensic Science
Advisory Council, which includes representatives from the across
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